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This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis consists of about sixty Florida
cases, excluding memorandum decisions and a few others not of sufficient
importance to be noted here, as found in Volume 54 of the Southern
Reporter, Second Series, Pages 1 through 672 (advance sheets from
October 4, 1951 through November 29, 1951). In addition to these are
included two federal cases interpretative of Florida law. These are found
in 72 Sup. Ct. I through 117 (advance sheets from November 15, 1951
through December 1, 1951), 191 F.2d 1 through 928 (advance sheets from
October 8, 1951 through December 3, 1951), all of Volume 99 of the
Federal Supplement and 100 F. Supp. 1 through 456 (advance sheets from
October 1, 1951 through November 26, 1951).
ADMINISTRATiVE LAW. Arbitrary action by administrative board. A court
of equity will not ordinarily enjoin the acts of an administrative board
which is acting within its discretionary powers. However, the chancellor
will not be deemed to have abused his power by granting an injunction
where it appears that the board contemplates taking actions which will
cause serious injury to nearby land, and which will cause unsanitary condi-
tions in a nearby city.1
Judicial review. Findings of fact of the Railroad and Public Utilities
Commision when supported by evidence will not be disturbed on appeal to
the courts.2
Premature court action. A state administrative board which must rule
on a special point but which has not as yet issued its ruling is not required
to defend against a bill for a declaratory decree on such matter, as the
question is premature.3
ARREST. Search and seizure. A defendant must claim and prove him-
self to be the owner, occupant or lessee of property searched before he
will be afforded protection from unreasonable search and seizure.4
Seizures incident to a lawful arrest are also lawful and information
obtained as a result of such seizures may be used as evidence. 5
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was prepared for publication by Donald C.
McCormick and edited by Allan S. Kushen.
1. State Road Dept. v. Newball Drainage District, 54 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1951).2. FLA. STAT. § 323.03(3) (1949), Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Mack, 54 So.2d
153 (Fla. 1951).




ATTORNEYS. Admission to practice. The State Board of Law Exam-
iners has authority to issue certificates of admission to practice law without
further examination to Negroes who were compelled to secure their educa-
tion outside of the state and who have received an LL.B. degree from an
accredited school or who have enrolled in an accredited law school outside
the state on or before July 25, 1951.9
Fees. A Florida statute7 providing for the allowance of attorney's fees
in judgments in favor of the beneficiary of any policy or contract of insur-
ance does not apply to fidelity bonds which insure an employer against his
employees' dishonesty, in the absence of specific provision for such fees
in the contract,8
BRoras. Suspension. The Florida Real Estate Commission has the
burden of proving the allegations in an information filed by it against a
registered real estate broker charging him with employing an unregistered
real estate salesman.
CONsTrrnFrIONAL LAW. Segregation. Petitioner, a Negro, brought
an action for mandamus to compel the manager of a city-owned golf course
to permit him to play golf at any time the course was open. The manager
had previously promulgated a rule allotting one day in each week for the
exclusive use of the club by Negroes. The court held that so long as segre-
gation is not unlawful in Florida a writ of manadamus will not issue to
prohibit the manager from making rules concerning segregation. However,
the court refused to rule on the legality of the present regulation, pointing
out that the petitioner may test it specifically by petition for declaratory
decree or mandamus. 10
CONTRACTS. Consideration: Second contract. A vendor and vendee
contracted for the sale of the controlling interest in a corporation. Subse-
quently a second contract was substituted which cancelled the first and
provided for the purchase of a smaller amount of stock, carrying with it the
condition that the stock would be voted by a voting trust in accordance with
an agreement to be entered into which would be acceptable to both parties.
The vendor later refused to enter into any voting trust arrangement. The
court held that since the second contract was void for failure of consideration
(the consideration being the subsequent voting trust agreement), the can-
cellation of the first contract was ineffective and the vendee was entitled
to specific performance of the first contract or of the second contract without
the trust."
Deposit refund. A vendor and vendee entered into a contract for the
sale of a piece of property. It developed that there was a cloud on the title,
6. In re Watts, 54 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1951).
7. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1949).
8. Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Union Finance Co., 54 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1951).
9. Ringo v. Owens, 54 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1951).
10. Rice v. Arnold, 54 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951).
11. Streit v. King, 54 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1951).
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since the government held a tax lien on the property. The vendor notified
the vendee that a compromise with the government was pending and author-
ized the vendee to withhold the amount of the lien from the purchase
money still owing until the lien was satisfied. The court held that these
acts were not sufficient to remove the cloud and make the title merchantable
and that therefore the vendee was entitled to a refund of his deposit. 12
Estop pel to rescind. A purchaser who, subsequent to his discovery of
the alleged fraud of the vendor, pays sums due on the purchase money mort-
gage cannot then obtain rescission of the contract on the ground of fraud."3
Rescission. Where a purchaser of land takes a warranty deed, pays the
purchase price, enjoys possession and there is no fraud, he cannot, prior to
any threat of eviction, obtain the aid of a court of chancery to rescind the
contract when it appears that the building on the land encroaches on an-
other lot. The only remedy, if one exists at all, is a suit at law on the cove-
nants in the deed. 14
CoUIErs. Approval.of bonds by freeholders. The Florida Constitu-
tion 1' requires that a majority of the freeholders must vote on a given bond
issue in order for it to be valid. It makes no difference that the bond issue is
approved by a majority of the freeholders actually voting.' 6
Certificates of indebtedness. Payment of certificates of indebtedness
issued by the County Commission of Monroe County for the construction of
a jail cannot be insured by the irrevocable pledge of the "full faith and
credit" of the county without the approval of a majority of the freeholders. T
The Board of County Commissioners of Broward County, pursuant to
statutory authority,'8 purchased a number of voting machines and issued
certificates of indebtedness, to be discharged by an ad valorem tax on all
taxable property in the county. The court held that, since the voting ma-
chines were not a governmental necessity, the certificates must be approved
by a vote of a majority of the freeholders. 10  The dissent contended that
voting machines are a "current governmental need" and that therefore a
vote of the freeholders was not necessary. 20
COURTS. Judicial notice. Since the court does not take judicial notice
of municipal ordinances, it will not look to an ordinance to see if a party has
exhausted his administrative remedies.21
12. McClosky v. Johnston, 54 So.2d 517 (fla. 1951).
13. Johnson v. Green, 54 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1951).
14. Ibid.
15. FLA. CONsr. Art. IX, § 6.
16. State v. Dade County, 54 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1951).
17. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6, Sunshine Construction of Key West v. Board of
Comm'rs, Monroe County, 54 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1951).
18. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25181.
19. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6, FLA. S'rAT. § 135.01 (1949), State v. Broward
County, 54 So.Zd 512 (Fla. 1951).
20. State v. Broward County, supra note 19 at 513 (Fla. 1951).
21. Miami Shores Village v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 54 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1951).
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Rules. A judicial circuit may not by a general order contravene the
rules of procedure set down by the Supreme Court.22
CRIMINAL LAW. Confessions. The question of whether a confession
was voluntary must be raised by evidence or testimony on the part of the
defendant at the time of the hearing to determine the admissibility of the
confession in evidence. Otherwise, a presumption arises that it was volun-
tarily given. 23
Larceny. The evidence in a prosecution for grand larceny must estab-
lish not only that the property was stolen but also that it was worth more
than fifty dollars. -' It is not sufficient that the evidence merely shows that
property similar to that stolen was ordinarily worth more than fifty dollars.25
Lotteries. A defendant indicted for selling lottery tickets in one count
and possessing lottery tickets in a second count can only be convicted and
sentenced for one offense. The court considered it illogical for one set of
facts to establish that a man is both operator and patron of a lottery.2
Manslaughter. Evidence which merely shows that a truck was driven
at an excessive rate of speed on an open road, that it got out of control and
caused an accident, is insufficient to show negligence of such a gross and
flagrant character as will support a verdict of manslaughter?7
Mistrial for tampering with jury. Where it appears that persons
attempted unlawfully to communicate and tamper with the jury, the trial
judge is justified in declaring a mistrial. In a subsequent prosecution such
a mistrial will not support a plea of double jeopardy.28
Offense committed by a corporation. Except where an offense is
punishable by death or imprisonment only, a corporation may be held
criminally liable even though the act constituting the offense be ultra vires
or one for which a specific intent is essential. It makes no difference that
the offense is punishable by either fine or imprisonment or both.29
Procedure: Bail in capital offenses. Defendant was convicted of rape.
The jury recommended mercy and the trial judge reduced the sentence to
fifteen years. Defendant then applied to the trial court for a supersedeas
bond pending his appeal. From a denial of this application he appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's reduction of the sentence
coupled with the jury's recommendation of mercy indicated extenuating
circumstances sufficient to warrant the granting of bail pending appeal. 30
The dissent agreed that bail could legally be granted but argued that it
was within the trial judge's discretion to decide whether extenuating cir-
22. Strong v. Clay, 54 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1951),
23. Hearn v. State, 54 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1951),
24. FtA. STAT. § 811.01 (1949).
25. Bornstein v. State, 54 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1951).
26. Mixon v. State, supra note 4.
27. Williams v. State, 54 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1951).
28. State ex rel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1951).
29. State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, 54 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1951).
30. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 9, Cray v. State, 54 So.2d 436 (Fla.
1951).
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cumstances sufficient to warrant the granting of bail were present and that
his decision should not be disturbed on appeal.3 '
Procedure: Burden of proof. When a wound has been inflicted from
which death might occur and death does in fact occur, the burden of proof
is upon the defendant to make it appear that some other agency could have
caused the death.3 2
Procedure: Committing of insane defendant. The Florida statute 3-
which provides that no defendant committed to an institution by a court
for reasons of insanity shall be released therefrom without the consent of
the court committing him does not apply where the committing court on
motion of the Attorney General has granted an unconditional nolle prosse
of the indictment.34
Procedure: Mistrial. A mistrial is a "trial" as contemplated by the
statute3 which provides for the release of an accused whose request for a
trial is not granted within three terms after he has been first committed,
and operates to start the statute running anew.36
Procedure: Request for speedy trial. A defendant who wishes a speedy
trial must ask for it. It will not be afforded him as a matter of course.37
Procedure: Reversible error. It is not reversible error for the assistant
prosecuting attorney to remark in the presence of the jury that the court
would have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant if the material
allegations of the indictment had not been proved, since it appeared that
the portion of the indictment alluded to had been substantially admitted
by the defendant. 38
Self-incrimination. A party who voluntarily discloses information con-
cerning lotteries is not entitled to the statutory immunity3 which is given
to witnesses who are required to give such information, even though the
information tends to convict him of a crime.40
Self-incrimination by a corporation. A corporation is not entitled to
protection under Florida statutes41 designed to protect private persons from
self-incrimination. 42
DECLARATORY JUDGMYENTS. Power to entertain. Since the State Road
Department is the sole judge as to the manner in which 80 per cent of
surplus gas tax funds shall be applied to state roads, the Supreme Court
will not, prior to the exercise of discretion by the board, entertain a bill
31. Gray v. State, supra note 30 at 437.
32. Hopper v. State, 54 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1951).
33. FLA. STAT. § 917.01 (1949).
34. Trippodo v. Rogers, 54 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1951).
35. FLA. STAT., § 915.01(1) (1949).
36. Kelly v. State, ex rel. Morgan, 54 So,2d 431 (Fla. 1951).
37. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, §§ 4, 11, F... STAT. 915.01(1), Kelly v.
State ex rel. Morgan, supra note 36.
38. Hopper v. State, supra note 32.
39. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1949).
40. McKown v. State, 54 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1951).
41. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1949).
42. State ex rel. Losey v. Willard, supra note 29.
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for a declaratory judgment questioning its right to act as to that surplus in a
certain manner.4 3
DIVORCE: Alimony. Misfortune or sharp decline in income is the proper
test by which alimony payments may be reduced. The mere fact that a
husband and his second wife are living extravagantly above the husband's
income is not sufficient to allow a reduction in alimony.44
Alimony and attorney's fees. An order awarding temporary alimony and
attorney's fees to an alleged wife in a divorce case merely determines that
her- allegations as to the existence of a common-law marriage are prima
facie established for the purposes of the order. It is not res judicata as to
the contested existence of the marriage, even though the Supreme Court
denies a writ of interlocutory certiorari to review.43
EQurrY. Injunction against execution sale. An equity court does not
have jurisdiction to issue an injunction without notice to restrain an execu-
tion sale unless fraud is clearly, positively and unequivocally asserted as a
basis for such relief.46
EVIDENCE. Dead man statute. A widow is not prevented by Florida's
"dead man" statute47 from testifying that the interlineation of her name
in a deed to the decedent was made prior to its delivery when other heirs
have previously testified that the decedent had claimed the property as
his own exclusively.48
Private papers. There is no material difference between obtaining
books and papers in an illegal search and seizure and obtaining them by
forcing their owner to produce them. If either method is used Florida
statutes49 will not permit such books and papers to be used in evidence
against their owner.50
Unsigned letters. A typewritten letter from a decedent to his attorney
which bears the deceased's typed nickname and is enclosed in an envelope
addressed in his own handwriting and bearing his return address is properly
admitted as evidence even though it was not signed personally in the
decedent's own handwriting. 1
Admissibility: Other crimes. Admission of evidence tending to prove
other crimes separate and wholly independent from the crime alleged in
the indictment is prejudicial error.5 2
FAMILY LAW. Husband and wife: Partition of property. A wife brought
an action against her husband for separate maintenance and for an equitable
43. Hollywood v. Broward County, 54 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1951).
44. Schiff v. Schiff, 54 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1951).
45. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 54 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1951).
46. Parrish v. Joyner, 54 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1951).
47. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1949).
48. Mayer v. Mayer, 54 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1951).
49. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1949).
50. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 12, State ex rel. Byer v. Willard, 54 So.2d
179 (Fla. 1951).
51. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, 54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951).
52. Smith v. State, 54 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1951).
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division of their common property. The chancellor found that the wife
was not entitled to separate maintenance but that since the property was
jointly owned an equitable division of the property should be decreed.
He then appointed a receiver to manage the property until a divorce was
granted or until the parties agreed to a division. The Supreme Court held
that as long as the parties remained husband and wife no division of the
property should be ordered and that the appointment of the receiver was
in error. The dissent agreed that a receiver should not have been appointed
but argued that equity has the power to order a partition of the property?
4
Marriage: Common-law. All other requirements being present, the fact
that a common-law marriage had its inception in a state which did not
recognize such marriages will not defeat the marriage in this state after the
parties have come to Florida and have continued to live openly as man
and wife.55
GAMING. Confiscation. Appeal is not the proper manner in which to
challenge an order confiscating and declaring forfeit money taken from a
defendant at the time of his arrest for operating a gambling house.58
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Unauthorized persons in grand jury room.
Although the presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room
is highly irregular and not to be condoned, the mere presence of such
persons does not render an indictment ipso facto void. The only proper
remedy in such case is a motion to quash, not a writ of prohibition.3
INSURANcE. As security for liabilities. Decedent assigned the proceeds
from certain insurance policies to a bank as security for any and all of
his liabilities arising in the ordinary course of his business. He became
liable to the bank on his own personal notes, as surety on other notes
and on checks upon which his name did not appear individually but the
proceeds of which he received directly from the bank. The court held that
the bank was entitled to deduct the amounts of all of the notes and checks
before paying the balance to the decedent's widow.58
Indemnity bond. Knowledge of an employee's dishonesty communi-
cated to an agent of his employer is not such knowledge of the employer
as will discharge the survey on a fidelity or surety bond which provides
for termination of the bond when the insured employer learns of any
dishonest or fraudulent acts of the insured employee?9
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Failure to give written notice of option to extend.
Consequences of failure to give written notice by the lessee of his option
to extend the lease, as required by the rental contract, will be relieved
by a court of equity where it appears that the lessor had actual notice
53. Clawson v. Clawson, 54 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1951).
54. Id. at 163.
55. Navarro, Inc. v. Baker, 54 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1951).
56. O'Brien v. State, 54 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1951).
57. State ex. rel. Losey v. Willard, supra note 29.
58. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, s&urd note 51.
59. Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Union Finance Co., sutra note 8.
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of the lessee's intention to extend and that the lessor was not injured by
the failure to give proper notice.60
LmNs. Mechanic's liens. Not attachable to lands held for public use.
A mechanic's lien will not attach to real property donated to a municipal
corporation in trust for the use of the general public in perpetuity.01
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Charter powers. The North Bay Village charter
provided for the village to be governed by a council of five and that a
majority of the council constituted a quorum. Two vacancies on the council
occurred which were never filled. The court held that although only three
members remained on the council, a majority of two would not be sufficient
to transact business. 2
Civil service. If a police sergeant on probation fails to pass the tests
and requirements of civil service rules, 3 the police chief, with the approval
of the civil service board, may order his return to his previous rank. 4
Elections. The City of Miami is authorized to hold a special bond
election on the same clay on which a regular municipal city commissiqn
election is being held.':
Employees. An act 0 which authorizes the re-employment of retired
city employees but which does not fix the compensation to be paid to such
employees impliedly authorizes the employing authorities to fix their com-
pensation at the time of rehiring. 7
Roads and bridges. Relying on a Florida statute 8 which provides funds
for the improvement of roads and bridges in an incorporated city, the court
held that the city commission of Fort Lauderdale could not pledge such
funds to aid construction" of bridges and tunnels throughout the county. 9
PARTNERSHIP. Dissolution. A partnership owned and operated two cor-
porations. Dissension arose between the partners and some of them
requested dissolution of the partnership and appointment of a receiver.
The court held (1) that dissolution of the partnership and appointment
of a receiver does not require dissolution of the corporations and (2) that
where confidence, good faith, square dealings and honesty disappear among
the members of a partnership, it ought to be dissolved.70
PROCEDURE. Appeal and error; Time. If the last day of a period allowed
for appeal falls on Sunday, its filing oi the following Monday is too late
to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. This is true with respect to criminal
as well as civil appeals. 71
60. Dugan v. Haige,' 54 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1951).
61. St. Augustine v. Brooks, 54 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1951).
62. Clark v. North Bay Village, 54 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1951).
63. FLA. STAT. § 87.01 et seq. (1949).
64. St. Petersburg v. Bolender, 54 So.Zd 31 (Fla. 1951).
65. State v. Miami, 54 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1951).
66. Fla. Spec. Acts 1947, c. 24619, § 1.
67. State ex rel. Poston v. Kennedy, 54 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1951).
68. FLA. STAT. § 343.17 (1949).
69. Nelson v. Fort Lauderdale, 54 So.2d 207 (Fla. 19511.
70. Lieberbaum v. Levine, 54 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1951).
71. Newsom v. State, 54 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1951).
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Findings of master. Where the master finds that a contract concerning
real property exists and was partially performed and the chancellor accepted
these findings it is error to refuse specific performance. 72
Notice: By publication. A statute7a which requires published notice
for a period of thirty days does not require publication in every issue of a
daily paper, since notice in a weekly would be sufficient.74
Parties: Intervenors. A purchaser of land brought suit against his vendor
to rescind their contract. The trial court permitted the broker to intervene
for the purpose of asserting a legal claim for his commission against the
vendor. Upon dismissing the complaint without prejudice the chancellor
ordered the purchaser to answer the intervenor's claim. The supreme court
held that the purchaser was improperly retained in the cause and should
not have been required to answer the broker's claim. 75
Pleading: Variance. Where an indictment charges the defendant with
embezzlmeent of certain jewelry and it is proved that he had authority
to convert the jewelry into cash which he subsequently converted to his
own use, there is a variance between the proof and the crime charged,
which will entitle the defendant to a new trial. 6
Summary procedure. A motion to strike a portion of the defendant's
answer coupled with a motion for summary judgment is tantamount to a
waiver of the movant's request for a jury trial in the initial pleadings.77
Venue. An application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.78
PROPERTY. Deathbed gift. A decedent who, at the time of his death,
owns only a portion of a fruit farm may not make a deathbed gift to his
wife of the entire proceeds from the sale of the produce from such farm.79
Homestead exemption. A divorced man who is paying support money
for a child in the custody of his ex-wife is still considered "the head of the
family" for personal homestead exemption of $1000.0
Real: Adverse possession. One who has been in open, hostile, con-
tinuous, undisputed possession of a piece of property for a period of time
in excess of seven years obtains title thereto by adverse possession."'
Real: Restrictions. Restrictive covenants in a conveyance which curtail
the free and untrammeled use of real property arc not favored by the law
and are strictly constructed. However, where the intent is clear and the
restrictions are not unreasonable, the courts will enforce them. 2
72. Sager v. Roberts, 54 So.2d 157 (F1a. 1951).
73. FLA. STAT., § 135.01 (1949).
74. FLA. STAT., § 49.01 (1949), Sunshine Construction of Key West, Inc. v.
Board of Comm'rs, Monroe County, supra note 17.
75. Jermak v. Fisher, 54 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1951).
76. Eastow v. State, 54 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1951).
77. Silva v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa, supra note 51.
78. Gardner v. State, 54 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1951).
79. Whidden v. Johnson, 54 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1951).
80. FL. CONST. Art. X, § 1, Larsen v. Austin, 54 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1951).
81. Johnson v. Green, sutpra note 13.
82. Ballinger v. Smith, 54 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1951).
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SALES. Fair trade agreements. A retail liquor store which did not execute
a fair trade contract or agreement with distilling companies is not bound
by fair trade agreements made by the distillers with other liquor dealers
throughout the city and state and may, if it so desires, sell beverages below
the prices fixed by said agreements.83
STATUTEs. Title. The title of an act should fairly apprise a person reading
it of its contents. Hence, an act 4 which merely purports to recreate the
City of Sarasota, but contains therein provisions granting sovereign lands
of the state of Florida to the incorporated area, will not operate as a
transfer of such lands.8 5'
TAXATION. Advertising purposes. The Florida legislature passed an act 0
authorizing the Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County to
levy a tax for the purpose of advertising the advantages, facilities and
products of various taxing districts set up by the board. Pursuant to such
act the Board of County Commissioners set up separate taxing districts,
held referendum elections and imposed taxes on property owners in the
district approving the tax. The court held that (1) a tax for the purpose
of advertising is constitutional, (2) the spending of the tax money by the
Chamber of Commerce under the supervision of the Board of County
Commissioners is not unconstitutional on the gound that governmental
power is delegated to persons not appointed by the Governor or elected
by the people and (3) that since the tax only applies to those districts
which approve it, it cannot be said to be unreasonable and arbitrary. 7
ToRTs. Survival of actions. No right of action exists under the Florida
survival statute 8 in favor of a decedent's estate if the death is instan-
taneous and unaccompanied by pain and suffering. 9
TRADE-MARKS. Unfair competition. In the absence of a showing of
intentional appropiation or misrepresentation, equity will not enjoin under
either state or federal law, on the theory of unfair competition, the use
of the trade-mark "Creamette" where it appears that the plaintiff sold
only macaroni products under that name and the defendant used the
name to identify his frozen sweet or dessert products,
TRUSTS. Constructive. A constructive trust may be proved by parol
testimony, but the evidence necessary to establish such a trust must be
sufficiently clear, strong and unequivocal as to remove any reasonable doubt
as to the trust's existence91 from the chancellor's mind.
Wms. Dower: Election of. A widow is entitled to her dower rights in
certain stocks notwithstanding the fact that there was a specific bequest of
83. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So.2d 239 (Ha. 1951).
84. Fla. Spec. Acts 1945, c. 23529 § 6.
85. Bird Key Corp, v. Sarasota, 54 So.2d 245 (FIa. 1951).
86. Fla. Laws 1949, e. 26294.
87. Miller v. Ryan, 54 So2d 60 (Fla. 1951).
88. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1949).
89. Beaven v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 100 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
90. Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1951).
91. Lightfoot v. Rogers, 54 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1951).
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the stocks to a named beneficiary and that the residuary estate contained a
sufficient amount of money to pay the widow the market value of said
stock.92
Implied revocation. The mere fact that there is a divorce and a prop-
erty settlement does not impliedly revoke a prior will or bequest by a
divorced wife in favor of her ex-husbandY3
Probate. Since no property passes until a purported will is probated,
a party need not file a renunciation and disclaimer as a condition precedent
to objection to its admission to probate 51
ZONING. Constitutionality. A municipal ordinance which zones certain
pieces of property for residential purposes is unconstitutional and void as
being arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory and unrelated to the public
welfare when it appears that the property in question is surrounded by
other business properties and is unsuited for residential purposes.96
Liquor licenses. A town will not be deemed to have acted in an arbi-
trary manner simply because it refused to allow the operation of two liquor
businesses within 75 feet of each other."'
92. In re Malone's Estate, 54 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1951).
93. Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1951).
94. FLA. STAT. § 732.26 (1949).
95. In re Purdy's Estate, 54 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1951).
96. Miami Shores Village v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., supra note 21.
97. Ragozzino v. Town of Maitland. 54 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1951).
